

SECRET

9/2740/25.

9th September, 1941.

Many thanks for sending me a report on subversive organisations in Greece, which, I am sure, will be of great use to my people; also the two reports on Roumanian refugees, which are of much interest.

It had occurred to me, in regard to the latter, however, that, seeing that our Balkan organisation are, in point of fact, running Beza and Vulpesca, your local representative might conceivably have discussed the question with Maxwell or Bailey on the spot, before sending in his report. Perhaps he did. Anyhow, I imagine that the liaison will be far better now that Mr. Lyttelton has formed his Committee, on which, as I understand it, both S.O.E and S.I.S., Middle East, are represented.

(Sgd:-) GLADWYN JEBB.

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ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

No. 566.

To: the S.O.S.

4 JUL 1941

From L/D/R.

RC

0/25

Regd.  
No.

# MOST SECRET

M.E.W.

06 August, 1941.

SS  
G.

Draft: Letter  
To: "D"  
Name: Mr. Webb,

PERSONAL

If what I am told is true, the documents known as "I.B.O.S" contain information of the highest possible interest to S.O.S. Indeed, I believe that, of all the Services, S.O.S would be the most directly interested in I.B.O.S reports, since the lives of their agents might very well depend on the information they contain.

Would you, therefore, consider letting Archie Boyle have copies of these reports? Needless to say, he would not circulate them as such to anybody and only pass on the gist to the country section concerned, if necessary. Further, no action of any kind would be taken on such a report without first obtaining your permission.

I think you will agree that Boyle has great experience in handling such matters and that, from the point of view of

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

To my children - I am very sorry to have to do this. Keep on my mind for 10th Aug 1942

view of security there would be no  
danger at all if you agreed that the  
reports should go to him.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

No. 565.

To: the C.M.C.

4 JUL 1941

From E.D.

0/25

RCO

See Min. Rec.  
N.S. Minutes N:38

of 10/7/41

Reference 0/25  
00/00

SECRET:

MINISTER:

P/2665/75 ←  
of 10/7/41

Please see the attached copy of my letter of  
yesterday, to "C".

C.D. and I raised the question with "C" this  
afternoon of Communism, and he said that he would ask  
Colonel Vivian and M.I.5 whether they could produce  
any latest evidence as to the attitude of the Comintern  
in this country or in others. (He thought that 40000  
ought to be able to send in something interesting.)

"C" also said that he, himself, was all in  
favour of using Communists in the present circumstances  
and would have no objection if we dropped a Communist  
in the occupied area whose function would be to get in  
touch with the Communist workers in Paris or elsewhere.  
He would still, however, be opposed to our getting  
Dolivet to visit this country, for instance, or making  
any approaches to him or to his political associates  
which might be likely to get to the ears of Vichy.  
Nobody really knew if any good would still come from  
the approaches which had been and still were being made  
to Vichy, but he was still working through two channels  
on the direct instructions of the Prime Minister.

"C" finally suggested that the question of our  
attitude towards Communism and the Comintern ought soon  
to be considered by the highest authorities and some  
decision, if possible, extracted from the War Cabinet.

Q

11th July, 1941.

(1) I have your favour for D's general visit to  
France. I am only interested to consider  
whether his alleged calls in France should be  
contested.

(2) This is not an urgent matter for the Cabinet for a  
"decision" while C can give some answer  
to my questions in Note N.1 in it. Keep me posted.

REGIMENT  
1941

Sec. of State Rec'd.  
N.Y. Office No 38  
C.S.C. of 10-7-41.

Reference 6735

If anything is to come of Communist contacts,  
dissident or "orthodox", it will have to be taken up  
much more strongly and presumably at a higher level.  
"C" is evidently straining it took a month to get an  
opinion on the desirability of Communist contacts, and  
then another month to arrange this meeting which seems  
to have been entirely inconclusive.

*Reb*

12th July, 1941.

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558 OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

**MOST SECRET**

No. 566.

To: The C.S.C.

From I.D.

9/25  
9 JUL 1941

RCB

4th July, 1941.

No. 566.

To: the C.I.D.

O/25  
4 JUL 1941

From T/DI.

RC

**MOST SECRET**

4th July, 1941.

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ACT 1958

१०. अंगू.

$$2\Omega_1 - \Omega_2(\Omega_1) \leq 0 \quad \square.$$

From 1/1/14.

4500-1415, 2500.0.

THIS IS A COPY  
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT RETAINED  
IN DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
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ACT 1958

1st July 1941.

Dear C/D,

Yours of June 30th re Communist Party.

I consulted Colonel Vivian on this, as he is the Communist expert here. He tells me that he is meeting one or more of your officers tomorrow, July 2nd on this very subject and will discuss it in detail.

In the meantime may I give you the following generalities. I have in the past frequently endeavoured to get some good (i.e. information) out of Communists. I have found them most ineffective, even when willing. It is chiefly because the information they produce contains some effort to prove their own case. Their promises - and there were many - never materialise.

At the time of the Munich crisis they were most prolific with promises, not only as regards information but even action in the event of war breaking out. Nothing happened. This covers Communists of all countries. The Germans, I found a long way the most ineffective.

Nevertheless, for your particular task, I cannot see why you should not try and use them, but (and I think it is a big "but") they need to be strictly insulated and not permitted in any way to penetrate your organisation.

Perhaps you will think this injunction rather a statement of the obvious, because of course it is just what they would like to do.

Yours ever,

ACB

ADM/RM/512.

26.6.41.

26/6

SECRET

Copy to CEO

30/6/1941

SECRET

RB

117 see the answer to 3/7

30th June 1941.

7 JU. 1941

CO. to CEO

Communist Party

As instructed in  
S.P.C. document on  
attached - I  
Enclose herewith a  
brief account of  
a meeting with  
Col. Vivian and  
Loy, L.S., & L.G.

It doesn't go  
us very far!  
By the time Col.  
Vivian has passed  
he will probably be  
overtaken by the course  
of events!

I am returning 7/7 in advance

Communist Party.

thing of & querulous as to how we stand  
regarding the Communist Party qua the

very complex problem and I am being pressed  
into some kind of a directive on the subject  
desirous to contact the "Communists" with  
regarding that they play at suborning Nazi agents.

Now I am being pressed  
as to whether we should not use the so-called  
North and South America with a view to  
activities.

First job as always is to keep in step with  
what could give me a directive as to how S.P.C.  
problem it might clear my mind as to the

At the moment spoken to Swinton direct - in  
point of doing so this morning when I thought  
and more properly ask I.I.S. through you  
they are taking vis-a-vis this problem.

C.P.

ADM/XX/512.

26.6.41.

926

Copy to CED

Mr. M.  
G.M.

SECRET

21 Jun 1941

Directive to the members of C.P.  
Let me off 11 50th June 1941.

(2)

Dear A.G.S.C.,  
Communist Party.

I am in something of a quandary as to how we stand  
in regard to contacting the Communist Party and the  
Communist Party!

This is a very complex problem and I am being pressed  
by my people to give some kind of a directive on the subject  
i.e., should we endeavour to contact the "Communists" with  
a view to suggesting that they play at suborning Nazi agents.

The U.S.A. communists - and I am being pressed  
for a directive as to whether we should not use the so-called  
Communists in North and South America with a view to  
countering Nazi activities.

I think my first job as always is to keep in step with  
S.I.S. - and if you could give me a directive as to how S.I.S.  
are viewing this problem it might clear my mind as to the  
immediate future.

I have not at the moment spoken to Swinton direct - in  
fact I was on the point of doing so this morning when I thought  
that perhaps I should more properly ask S.I.S. through you  
what action if any they are taking vis-a-vis this problem.

(2)

AMERICAN

26.6.41.

COI - C.D.

1 AM/2

With reference to the recent decision of the Prime Minister that Britain would not be the target of the German secret service or similar bodies for the purpose of espionage, it is felt that it is necessary to advise you that the German secret service, which is a secret service of the Nazi party, is not to be regarded as a secret service of the British Government. In this connection, British agents are not entitled to be treated in the same way as German agents.

British agents are entitled to be treated as secret service agents of the British Government, and not as secret service agents of the Nazi party. Furthermore, through diplomatic channels, we do our best to advise the German secret service of the British Government to act for the safety of our agents, because we do not like to have an espionage agent that they would be quick for the agent.

It should also be realized that we are involved in our secret service a very active assistance in neutrals countries. Again, our approach to our foreign neutrals would be on the same veiled terms, in order that no possibility of espionage could occur.

It should be further emphasized that the gain of our valuable information to the Nazi secret service in neutrals countries is of the greatest importance. The same applies to the United States, given our attitude as regards the neutrality of our own or associations.

In order to satisfy the fears of "A.I.C." or other or in the possible for the secret service information etc., we will be able to assure that it can be done, be taken, or the information wanted, will not enter co-operation with the

0/25

0/2225/25

AD/Z


Many thanks for your advice as to the reply which I should return to Arnold-Forster's complaint about the keeping of "C" reports. I duly got this off on the lines suggested.

Yesterday evening I had a telephone call on the subject from [redacted]. He said that he understood that we were in the habit of making copies of these reports for circulation at Baker Street. I told him that I knew nothing of this, adding that I felt that the story was probably quite unfounded. I promised, however, to look into the matter.

[redacted] said that "C" carefully numbers all the copies of the reports which he sends out, and for security reasons considers it generally unwise to allow any extra copies to be made, even for internal use in any particular organisation to whom the numbered copies may be sent. I told him that I thought we would be able to give him an assurance that we would strictly observe this condition, and that if by any chance, in any particular case, we wished an exception to be made, we would first refer the matter to [redacted]. I hope you will agree with this. In any case I have promised to telephone to [redacted] again and should be glad if you would let me know what you think before I do so.

(Sgd) PHILIP BROAD

9th May 1941.



~~SECRET & PERSONAL~~

0/25

From G.D.

CD/OR/375

Mr. C. A. A. AD/A, AL/3, AD/1.

4th May 1941

0/2203/25

7th May 1941

~~SECRET and PERSONAL~~

I am sorry that I have not been able to send an earlier reply to your letter of the 27th April (7/3869) about CX report "o.24 addressed to the American Department of the Foreign Office.

I am afraid that I must plead guilty to leaving with the Foreign Office, actually in Hopkins' room, a copy of this report which had been handed to me at Baker Street to take over to the Foreign Office as aide-memoire for use in a conversation with them. I was not aware of the rule to which you refer in para 2., and am extremely sorry that it should have been broken.

I will do my best to ensure that we are not guilty of any repetition of this offence.

(Bgd) PHILIP BROWN

Commander C. Arnold-Forster, R.A.,

SECRET & URGENT

0/25

From C.D.

CD. Jb/373

To C.E.O., AD/A, AD/Z, AD/1,  
M, D/Fin X, E, S, D/T.

4th May 1941

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1958

Liaison with C.

1. As a result of conversations which took place between C.E.O., C.S.S. and the writer last week - I had a long interview with the A.G.S.S. Colonel Dansey yesterday, and as a result I think we are entitled to assume that the following procedure will operate from now onwards for the future..

A. Liaison between C. and S.O.2 will be through the sole channel of Colonel Dansey (this is officially agreed by C.S.S. and C.E.O.).

B. Initial liaison will be between Section Heads of S.O.2 and C. (and also of course by subordinates in the various Sections under authority of the relevant Section Heads).

C. Routine decisions of importance will be reported to or referred to Colonel Dansey, and in so far as S.O.2 Sections are concerned these will be referred to or reported to Regional Heads, viz. AD/A, AD/Z, X, S.

D. Where any difference of opinion arises between an S.O.2 Section and a C. Section, Colonel Dansey will arbitrate - and if his decision cannot be accepted by the Section Head or Regional Head of S.O.2 or C., as the case may be, such a decision goes up for discussion in the first instance between C.S.S. and C.D.

E. If C.S.S. and C.D. cannot arrive at a decision it then goes up to Higher Quarters through C.E.O. so far as S.O.2 is concerned.

F. Colonel Dansey will act for all C. Sections, i.e... even those over whom he has at the present time no direct jurisdiction - and to make this perhaps clearer it should be added that Colonel Dansey's liaison will extend to and what may be called for want of a better term "shipping".

G. Colonel Dansey will be immediately given a room in this building which should be labelled "C" - and although he may not use it himself to any routine extent, i.e. daily visits, it was his suggestion that the room should be large enough for a conference of five or six people when these were made necessary as between C. and S.O.2, either with or without his presence.

H. Colonel Dansey will provide his own Secretary who will sit permanently in this room and deal with telephone calls, appointments etc.

2. During the course of my conference with Colonel Dansey an interview with \_\_\_\_\_ and Squadron-Leader Long was sandwiched, and as an initial effort I found Colonel Dansey's presence of the very greatest assistance. It was arranged at this interview that Squadron-Leader Long of C., \_\_\_\_\_ should have direct contact with Section Heads of S.O.2 so that he may be clearly informed on all details connected with S.O.2 wireless operators who are to be dropped or sent overseas, to elaborate this a little, Squadron-Leader Long explained that consistent with the necessary secrecy it will be of great assistance to him if he can be informed of the type of duty which each S.O.2 wireless operator will be expected to undertake, together with an idea of the territory from which he will send his messages, and so on and so forth.

3. E. of course will be present at any of these interviews between Squadron-Leader Long and S.O.2 Section Heads, should all three parties concerned desire this, but such interviews are not primarily intended to cover technical matters.

4. I also arranged - and I consider this very important - that provided S.O.2 can obtain from the Army two instructors, classed B.1. (if possible civilian operators before they joined up) will train these instructors so that in due course S.O.2 can use them at any of S.O.2 stations for instructing S.O.2 wireless operators.

5. I hope that this suggestion of mine may do away to a large extent with the difficulties of sending fully trained agents for a course of wireless to \_\_\_\_\_ which is bad for their discipline and only gives them a few hours work each day.

6. I have promised \_\_\_\_\_ that as soon as possible this week a considered statement shall be given to them of:-

- a) Urgent requirements for the June moon in enemy occupied territory in Western Europe.
- b) Pressing requirements elsewhere.
- c) Long term requirements.

7. I would ask that this should be very carefully dealt with - by which I mean that whilst our original request for a comparatively large number of suitcase wireless sets etc. for the Far East is perfectly reasonable and was quite clearly stated - whatever the reason may be and whoever may be to blame in C., it is obvious that large blocks of wireless sets cannot be issued by C. in a hurry for the simple reason that they do not possess them.

8. In regard to the purchase and use of wireless sets elsewhere, I desire that this should be discussed in the first instance with Colonel Dansey, and I have reason to believe that there will be no difficulties over this if it goes through this channel.

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ACT 1958

9. There are to the arrangements in our warheads as far as I witness, I was asked to my car and I was successful in persuading the warheads, first of all, to go and to go to see a certain team with Colonel Dansey so that he may at the complete information be as far as to the long term basis on which we can proceed and discuss our Far Eastern liaison, it is complete, memorandum at present by the warheads to C. Organisation

10. Will A.Y.A., A.Y.C., S, X, B and D/T please co-operate very fully on the basis of this memorandum so that all necessary data is seen as the immediate, overture of a form for C. - the commission to action basis of this new liaison - consideration of the very important memorandum on our present arrangements in events - wireless sets etc. - should be dealt with with examination and a great deal of tact - I think it would be an admirable thing if the officers above referred to could entertain Colonel Dansey to a small dinner to facilitate this new liaison, and at the same time to discuss what are means of smoothing out the wrinkles of the past and avoiding the wrinkles of the future

11. It is highly necessary to add that D/T's functions for the future will be even more important than in the past and - therefore the C. General Da says in order to have an early conversation with D/T on matters of routine and detail.

C. D.

ly,

C. - sub.

C. 1.0

20...

C/D hopes that he is just part of a <sup>4/20 APRIL, 1941.</sup> ~~regarding~~  
two interviews at ~~marking~~ <sup>marking</sup> ~~a~~ <sup>a</sup> ~~latter~~ <sup>latter</sup> ~~ship~~ <sup>ship</sup> ~~transformation~~  
regarding a operation with C in ~~concern~~  
~~confidential~~

80 APR 1941

4/20

From C.D.

CL/CH/178

To C.E.O.

30th April 1941.

Liaison with C.

1. The attached is copy of a memorandum sent to me by D.T., our liaison Officer with C., which I think puts our case very fairly.

2. Perhaps you would consider whether on Friday afternoon - if and when we see C. - we might put this matter to him without a specifically pointing out that the ~~subversives~~ is ~~now~~ more or less than to be eliminated if Arnold Foster and Vivian as the canalizing officers through whom all S.O.2 matters pass at present at Broadway.

3. A.T.S.S. tells me very definitely (and this is confirmed by C.C.S.), that ears of all Sections in C. are now more than prepared to play seriously with S.O.2 as between Section heads, and that the elimination of Arnold Foster and Vivian would be welcomed by everybody at C.

4. I think it likely that C. may raise the point that matter of principle may be settled by the Section heads in this way - which could ordinarily pass through some of the executive heads.

5. I think this can be answered by the statement that no matter of principle can be settled in C. unless it goes through the A.C.S.S., who is responsible for all the Sections with which we are primarily concerned i.e., France, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Spain.

*This clear vision  
should now be placed for  
reference, but C's people  
are constantly off and on  
so P.D. should be as informed  
as possible, and the C  
representatives of our  
people*

13.

27th April, 1941.

C.W. argues that he is justified in requesting that instructions in making a distinct step forward in regard to co-operation with C on communications, makes

G.D. S. W.

C.P.C.O.D.Y. 31/748

1. I discussed yesterday to some extent with C.S.S. and to a considerable extent with C.O.S. the need of increased liaison between S.O.S. sections and 'C' sections.

C.S.S. appears to have no fundamental objection to this and C.O.S. is ardently in favour of it, as I am myself.

2. It seems to me that it would be better if the move came from yourself. Would you have any objection either to writing to C.S.S. or speaking to him at your next meeting on Friday, May 2nd, on the following lines?

"In order to ensure full co-operation between S.I.S. and S.O.S. and to ensure that lines are not crossed, it seems of paramount importance that there should be direct liaison between the respective country sections of the two organisations.

"At the present moment there seems to be a certain amount of information available to one organisation which should be automatically available to the other.

"Also, there seems to be a need for closer co-operation regarding the actual handling of agents by one organisation or the other, all the more so now as the areas for recruiting agents become more limited. The ever increasing amount of work carried out by country sections in both organisations makes it almost impossible to canalise all liaison through single individuals."

3. A good case in point is the handling of new arrivals at the Royal Patriotic Schools. There, Major THORNTON does a quick preliminary interrogation and indicates whether a new arrival is likely to be of more value to S.O.S. or S.I.S.

Actually, of course, nobody can make a final decision of this nature until a most detailed interrogation has been carried out. This interrogation should be done by S.I.S. and S.O.S. in co-operation and even if it is decided that the man is of more value to S.O.S. he is bound to have a lot of information of value to S.I.S. Alternatively, a man earmarked for S.I.S. may have special information which is also valuable for an S.O.S. project.

It is only by the two sections concerned working hand in hand that the best results can be obtained.

S.E.C.

D/7  
29.4.41.

ly.

1st April, 1941.

C/D argues that he is justified in regarding  
this interview as marking a distinct step forward in  
regard to co-operation with C on communications matters.

C.D. to C.M.C. - 1st April 1941. S.C. AF 1248

AL

From C.D.

CL/DR/178

To C.M.C.

30th April 1941.

Liaison with C.

1. The attached is copy of a memorandum sent to me by P.T. (our liaison officer with C), which I think puts our case very fairly.

2. Perhaps you would like to know whether on Friday afternoon - 1st April when we saw C. - we left on this matter to him with C. specifically pointing out that the situation is looking more and more like the elimination of Arnold Foster and Vivian as the canalizing officers to whom all A.A.C. matters pass at present at Toulon.

3. A.C.C.S. tells me very definitely (and this is confirmed by C.A.S., that is to say of all Sect'ns in C. are now more than "prepared to play seriously with" A.A.C. as between Section Heads, and that the elimination of Arnold Foster and Vivian would be welcomed by everybody at C.

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C. D.

W.M.C.

L.Y.

C.D. hopes that he is justified in regarding  
this interview as marking a definite step forward in  
regard to co-operation with C in communications matters  
with A. T. I. 41

C.D.'s

T. M. T. C. S. S., M.L. 25...

AL

D. 566

C. 566

DT/CA/743

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and to a certain extent with S.I.S. the need of  
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almost impossible to canalize all liaison through single  
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3. A good case in point is the handling of new arrivals  
at the 'No 1' Patriotic Schools. There, Major T. M. T. C. S. S. is  
given priority and interrogates and indicates whether a new  
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information of value to S.I.S. Alternatively, a man demanded  
for S.I.S. may have special information which might be valuable  
for an S.O.S. project.

It is only by the two sections concerned working hand in  
hand that the best results can be obtained.

D/T  
2b.4.41.

R.M.C.

CD/OR/385.

C E O.

2.,  
25th April, 1941.

C/W argues that he is justified in regarding  
this interview as marking a definite step forward in  
regard to co-operation with C in communications matters.

C.D.'S WEEKLY MEETING WITH C.S.S., APRIL 25TH.

AC

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,  
BERKELLEY SQUARE HOUSE  
BERKELLEY SQUARE W 1

4/12 to Berkely

With very difficult  
I think we  
you should say  
to think you need  
no win of such  
a be let with  
stocks of which  
future - is  
I should start  
& come!!

afraid I have rather gone a

{ 11  
31/4/41/11

Yours ever  
Perry Dow?

13,

4th April, 1911. #

C. & O. argues that he is justified in regarding  
this interview as marking a distinct step forward in  
regard to co-operation with C on communications matters.

C. & O. has no objection to the C.S.S., now to 25%. At

to any further modification you  
desire to make.

Very truly yours,

John T. Moore

President of the C. & O. R. R.

Atlanta, Ga.

The President of the C. & O. R. R.

For J. T. Moore  
C. & O. R. R. Atlanta, Ga.

MAXWELL F. LEONARD, President

BIRMINGHAM, ALA.

DEERFIELD, MASS.

My dear Sirs,

Yours very truly,  
John T. Moore  
President of the C. & O. R. R.  
Atlanta, Ga.

John T. Moore  
President of the C. & O. R. R.  
Atlanta, Ga.

John T. Moore  
President of the C. & O. R. R.  
Atlanta, Ga.

Yours ever

John T. Moore

26 APR 18  
S. S. 365

C. E. O.

26 APR 18

26 APR 18  
M.C. A. till, 1941.

C.D. argues that he is justified in regarding  
this interview as warranting a distinct step forward in  
regard to co-operation with C on communistic matters

C.D. S. W. 26 APR 18 C.S.S., 26 APR 26

AB

28 APR 1941  
S. S. 365

28 APR 1941  
S. S. 365

OF 1

1

Dear Friend,

I have been asked to write to you on the  
following matter.

3.4.41, in regard to the American Delegation  
Committee, and addressed to the American Delegation  
of the Foreign Office, was copied and sent by  
the Foreign Office with a request for action. It  
is considered here and at the Foreign Office that it  
is most dangerous to copy these secret reports and  
to increase the numbers in issue. I  
on the understanding  
these reports are issued from here.  
numbered for the same reason.

reports be copied in future, I  
reassure my belief?

but that in fact  
that the origin  
as indeed is  
that are

the more  
said t

why I be  
on this point

Answer you to?

ly.

412000  
C.D. 1000  
C.D. agrees that he is justified in regarding  
this information as marking a definite step forward in  
regard to co-operation with C on communications matters.

C.D.'S WIRELESS MEETING WITH C.S.S., APRIL 25TH.

This is being circulated to every man of  
Section who is interested and C.D. expects  
him to take immediate action.

1. Permission of C would be given immediately if there  
is any chance of C's or anyone's Spanish who is either  
a trained or semi-trained wireless operator, or failing  
this, if an amateur who knows or is a novice, to get  
the Pioneer Spanish station - if it is any intelligent  
Spaniard who can get a set up but the man is not in a  
favourable course of wireless to make him available to be sent  
to Spain with or with any of our lots, when he is free, no,  
or separated.
2. There is, I understand, a specific reason for this but  
I am not sure what it is. I have the C.S.S.'s permission to  
broadcast it, if this, however, a connection with a  
transmitting set that is hidden somewhere in Spain but  
requires an operator.
3. If any Section head has occasion to telegraph overseas  
for information as to any specific person or persons  
I would like the name or names to be first of all referred to  
Colonel of C, in case these people are already in his  
files, which will save time and trouble and line-crossing  
to all concerned.
4. Will AD/Z kindly see that a copy of the Far Eastern  
Charter is sent to C.S.S. - but it will be  
if he could find time to take it personally to the  
C.S.S. for a short chat over the wireless project. This  
arises out of a request by E for a large number of  
wireless sets for the Far Eastern Mission, as it will  
have a far greater chance of being known to as it requires  
a proportion of what was asked for if C.S.S. and some of  
his people know what we are trying to do by means of it is  
Far Eastern Mission.
5. Will the French, Belgian and Dutch Sections who purpose  
to drop wireless operators in any of their respective  
countries during the next few months advise Colonel Dansey  
of C of their intentions to do so. If wireless  
sets are concerned, if it is two or three days it is  
small be less than 10 days. There is no  
reason to believe that their demands will be met. In  
this connection it should be explained to each wireless  
operator going across that he should not expect daily  
contact, i.e., he should not expect to be listened for  
seven days in the week.
6. It should also be arranged with him that in cases where  
he can be heard here but he cannot hear us - a simple  
signal, such as the playing of a certain tune on the  
P.T.C. transmitters on first contact, or, if possible, be  
arranged as an intimation that we have heard him altho'  
he has not been able to hear us.

and Sections C and D will be in a position to  
make a report to the C. We have only 1 set of trans-  
mitters and 1 set of receivers from each unit, so  
it is very difficult to have 2 sets. It will be  
questionable whether C" would be in a position to  
make a report if communication isn't forthcoming by C.  
C, or the whenever a telephone message is made in C.

8. This is desire of so that all wireless sets from C  
will be in C, and so men can be used to a  
certain extent for wireless intelligence to C and  
C will be in a position to make a report. In a very short  
course to men on people, or to identify troops by  
means of tanks or aeroplanes by numbers on the  
tanks etc., etc., which is the type of information  
which would be very beneficial to us.
9. I desire the fullest collaboration from all Section  
heads on this matter, for it is obvious that if C  
are interested in getting information for themselves  
we shall have a large degree of co-operation from  
them in equipping our people with wireless and giving  
them adequate reception from this end.

C. P.

21st April, 1941.

1. Subversive operations are being conducted in three different groups of territories:-

a). Countries defeated or occupied by the Axis  
In  
hostile to the invader and therefore provide the best material for subversion. Our objects here are  
- to prepare the populations and train the forces  
- to expose the enemy; (iii) to fight the subversive resistance, and to assist in its final victory.

b) Certain neutral countries at present threatened  
by the Axis. The best example is Spain. Our objects are to combat the political pressure of the Axis powers, to encourage resistance to invasion so that enemy forces are held up and embarrassed as much as possible, and to lay the foundations of successful revolt should the territory in question be occupied by the enemy.

c). Enemy countries. Here our final goal is internal disruption. But at present in this early stage of the war it is difficult to organise sabotage and impossible to provoke revolution. For the moment we have to be content with putting out secret propaganda, with making use of immigrant labour to act as a disruptive element and with training Italians and Germans for eventual action in their native territories.

2. Subversive warfare is by its very nature an offensive weapon. Moreover it can take many different forms; even if one line of action is checked, another can be developed. It is therefore unwise to think only in terms of eventual risings. The right policy is continual and increasing aggression. While all possible preparation must be made for general risings, it will not be in our interest that these should occur for a long time to come. Meanwhile we must press on with subversive activities and sabotage of every kind, including ca-vanny methods of production, bad workmanship, administrative muddling, as well as more open and violent action. While taking care not to provoke the enemy into severely repressive measures, we must harass him to the maximum extent and over the widest possible areas.

3. Among the countries occupied or defeated by the Axis powers, the existing situation and the future prospects of subversion differ considerably.

POLAND. Hatred of Germany is violent and universal and the whole population intensely patriotic. A military organisation to conduct subversion and sabotage in the event of defeat was established six months before the outbreak of war. Some arms have been obtained locally,

ly,

others



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1. What is the best way to approach a difficult problem?  
a. Break it down into smaller, more manageable parts.  
b. Try to understand the underlying concepts and principles.  
c. Use a step-by-step process to work through the problem.  
d. Work on it until you get it right, even if it takes a long time.  
e. Ask for help from others, such as teachers or peers, to gain different perspectives and insights.

2. What is the best way to study for an exam?  
a. Review the material regularly, rather than trying to memorize it all at once.  
b. Use active learning techniques, such as summarizing the material in your own words or teaching it to someone else.  
c. Create flashcards or use other memory aids to help you remember the information.  
d. Work on practice problems to reinforce what you have learned.  
e. Get a good night's sleep before the exam to help you stay alert and focused.

3. What is the best way to approach a difficult task?  
a. Break it down into smaller, more manageable parts.  
b. Try to understand the underlying concepts and principles.  
c. Use a step-by-step process to work through the task.  
d. Work on it until you get it right, even if it takes a long time.  
e. Ask for help from others, such as teachers or peers, to gain different perspectives and insights.

4. What is the best way to approach a difficult problem?  
a. Break it down into smaller, more manageable parts.  
b. Try to understand the underlying concepts and principles.  
c. Use a step-by-step process to work through the problem.  
d. Work on it until you get it right, even if it takes a long time.  
e. Ask for help from others, such as teachers or peers, to gain different perspectives and insights.

5. What is the best way to approach a difficult task?  
a. Break it down into smaller, more manageable parts.  
b. Try to understand the underlying concepts and principles.  
c. Use a step-by-step process to work through the task.  
d. Work on it until you get it right, even if it takes a long time.  
e. Ask for help from others, such as teachers or peers, to gain different perspectives and insights.

6. What is the best way to approach a difficult problem?  
a. Break it down into smaller, more manageable parts.  
b. Try to understand the underlying concepts and principles.  
c. Use a step-by-step process to work through the problem.  
d. Work on it until you get it right, even if it takes a long time.  
e. Ask for help from others, such as teachers or peers, to gain different perspectives and insights.

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1.  $\vec{r} = \vec{r}_0 + \vec{r}_1$

3.  $\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$  (This is the probability of getting a head on the first flip and a tail on the second flip.)

1. *Leucosia* *leucosia* (L.) *leucosia* (L.) *leucosia* (L.) *leucosia* (L.)

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In promoting subversion against the enemy, S.O.E. recently handed around by short w. on 20th, 1944, for the S.O.E. to do its best to recruit 1st S.A. (S.A. is a short for Special Agent) and infiltrate the members of S.A. into S.A. to be formed in aid of Govt. National with these members, it is to do the job. The S.O.E. will be responsible for the 1st S.A. of staff would say whether to agree or not with the policy recommended here, in its opinion that it is now available the men and men to be recruited for the work it out.

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1st April, 1941.

THE PROSPECTS OF SUBVERSION

1. FIELDS OF ACTION

(a) An increasing weakness of the Axis, and more particularly of Germany; is the occupation of vast areas of Europe where the defeated population hates the invader, and where armed force is required not only to keep order but also to compel the peoples to work.

(b) Further, the Axis, having embarked on total warfare, is trying to make the greatest use even of those countries which are still neutral to further its policy and aid its war effort, materially or politically. Thus neutral countries have been brought within the scope of subversive warfare, and though on balance the Axis may there hold the initial advantage, our greater resources in raw materials, in facilities for trade, and in sea communications will enable us eventually to turn the scales. The further development of air transport facilities - which are most urgently required - will hasten this end.

(c) Even in the enemy countries themselves, where direct action by S.O.E. is obviously most difficult, the foundation of the existing régimes by means of unbridled violence, ferocity and injustice has, of necessity, entailed the creation of disidence, discontent or disgust, however carefully concealed. These will in the final issue, and with proper encouragement, bring their own aftermath. Here the function of S.O.E. is to help the chickens to come home to roost.

2. Thus there are (in order of their present importance) three fields in which subversive warfare is now being conducted, viz -

(a) Defeated and occupied territories, incl' Rumania, Bulgaria and others, where no organised armed resistance.

(b) Neutral countries, including Spain and others, where there is intense political pressure by the Axis, or where pressure is likely to become so at some stage in .

(c) The home lands of the Axis Powers.

2. 3. AND METHODS OF SUBVERSIVE WARFARE

These vary widely, not only between the three broad groups above, but also in accordance with local conditions within the different groups. Each country can be expected to have its own methods of subversive warfare, following distinct lines of policy, and with varying degrees of success, according to the circumstances.

1. The occupied territories, Rumania, Bulgaria, following distinct lines of policy, and with varying degrees of success, according to the circumstances.

2. The neutral countries, including Spain, following distinct lines of policy, and with varying degrees of success, according to the circumstances.

3. The home lands of the Axis Powers, following distinct lines of policy, and with varying degrees of success, according to the circumstances.



#### 4. THE ART OF THE CITY OF SUBVERSIVE WARFARE

The possible field of action, the various aims, and the way in which they have been listed above. As regards the timing and the intensity of our activities, a basic principle is very true: we must treat each situation as it is. It is, however, possible to be on the offensive, and to do the initiative in spite of the lead that the Axis has been allowed to gain. Indeed it may shortly, and for some considerable time, be the only field in which we are able to take any "military" initiative on land (as distinct, of course, from the initiative on sea or in the air). Subversion has the further advantage that, if countered in one direction, it can continue in another, or if checked in one form, i.e. overt sabotage, some other is possible, e.g. clandestine sabotage, etc. Even if all activity should be momentarily checked, secret propaganda is still possible, and needless to say propaganda and action - S.O.1 and S.O.2 - are closely co-ordinated and work hand in hand. Subversion is the only policy for subversive warfare. If the former dictated by particular circumstances and in keeping with the general situation.

It follows that a consideration at any given moment of the "probable state of readiness and ability of certain countries to rise against the Nazi regime" is not by itself a "fruitful" one. Self-respect and a "normal" war-fare generally are, in the case of many countries, and for long will remain, much more to our advantage, both future and immediate, than a national rising. While keeping the eventual object in view and working towards that end, we are (within the limits of discretion and of general policy) in the meanwhile exploiting all immediate possibilities in order to attack our enemies now and maintain our offensive.

So, for the purpose of this paper, that is to say, for assessing the value of the factor of subversive warfare in the general appreciation of future strategy, we must take into our account for each country the situation regarding Subversion existing today and its future possibilities\*. The countries concerned are dealt with seriatim below.

#### 5. EXISTING SITUATION AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

##### (a) Occupied Territories

###### (i) POLAND

The whole Polish population is violently anti-German, and patriotic feeling is intense. No attempt has been or will be made to compromise with the enemy in any way.

Six months before the outbreak of war, i.e. in April 1939, the organisation of a secret military movement wa.

\* N.B. No attempt is here made to deal with the nature of subversive propaganda, since that is the specific province of S.O.1. The latter are, however, in agreement with the general policy embodied in this paper but.

After the article was published, the editor of the magazine, Mr. John G. Nichols, responded to the author's letter, stating that the author had been given a full opportunity to respond to the article and that the editor had not received any other letter from the author.

These activities are producing valuable results of which a brief summary follows. While as a large number of cases to be tried in Probate to be decided, but the administration of the territory is considered a great success. Parallel with this will be a trial, a trial of the case of the, was the subject, inheritance of the estate of the deceased, a large number of years, during which time it has been a great burden and expense to the administration and preparation for a final account, as heretofore.

After cover of the escort parties the organization and  
armament of the military transport in Poland is as follows:  
present situation is in 10 divisions having total of 41,000  
of which the equivalent of 4 divisions are armed with pow-  
erful weapons of some kind or another. The whole number  
of the fighters is the sum of the remainder, it being  
under 10,000. There are 11000 persons in vehicles,  
10000 horses, 10000 mules and 1000000000 cubic  
feet. Some 3000000000 cubic feet are available  
in the form of 1000000000 cubic feet of oil and 2000000000  
of 500000000 cubic feet of gas and 2000000000  
of 1000000000 cubic feet of coal gas. The  
total number of horses and mules is 1000000000.  
The horses and mules are being transported in  
1000000000 vehicles and the animals are to be  
supplied with 1000000000 cubic feet of gas.

The whole derivative can be written in this form:

(51) CZECHOSLOVAKIA

After Munich the organisation of an underground military movement was at once put in hand. Between that date and the outbreak of war a few selected staff officers of the organisation left Czechoslovakia for England and other countries in order to be prepared to carry on from outside; one or two more have since been smuggled out and have joined them. The headquarters abroad is now in England with the Czech Government.

Although we have been in contact with these Czech representatives at I.M.C. and at various J.I.L. 17 political and departmental considerations prohibited intimate contact except in one or two foreign capitals, and only since December, 1940, have we been able to establish effective liaison. Up to the breakdown of France, however, we were in a position of an "intelligence service" and arms, a majority of which was liaison, were necessarily clandestine nature of the means of transport.

The situation in Czechoslovakia differs markedly from that in Poland. The first basic difference is the racial composition of the two races. In Poland there is still continuous and unceasing warfare against the Poles. Acts of violence occur daily and the struggle is unremitting. In Czechoslovakia (or rather Bohemia and Moravia) there is on the surface a wary collaboration with the Germans, for, although President Hacha is directly under Dr. Benes's orders, yet he is in fact so in rating "very largely with von Neurath. The Czechs have decided rightly or wrongly that the better course is to make an appearance of collaboration with the Germans until the final day when revolt becomes possible.

There are two factors which have strengthened this attitude. The first is that the abortive rising of September, 1914, as far as ~~was~~ I was carried out, it is believed, at the instigation of the Anglo-French Supreme War Council, the second is that many Czechs have not forgotten human, for which they blame us. The Poles, on the other hand, feel that we honoured our word.

The result is that, while waiting and actively preparing for the insurrection, the Czechs are anxious not to exacerbate their masters and bring on again the fury of the Poles' Duma. This is the general atmosphere relaxed. Therefore, to a large extent they are ill-fitting their activities to warfare, except as regards organisation and preparation for a catastrophe. It is remarkable that, of course, the Poles, i.e. a man and a woman, of certain age, have not yet risen, though repelled, but it is to be expected from their centres abroad and not from Prague.

Intense secrecy is maintained regarding the extent and  
nature of the military support given to the rebels.

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the 26th of June 1810, and  
the 26th of June 1811.

So far, the only available list with  
Allied names is the one in the  
Soviet War of Resistance against  
Germany, which would  
seem to be the most reliable.  
Russia's contribution is little.  
For, in fact, it is well, over a draft  
final report of the Soviet  
Ministry of Defense, dated 1945, on  
the Soviet contribution to the  
liberation of Europe, which  
includes the names of all  
the Soviet military units and  
leadership, including  
the names of the  
Soviet political commissars, and  
is now being distributed.

W. S. , it's still hard to be a limited degree  
writer & so I write, but it is still necessary to be exact  
but, if I didn't do a few of the next few weeks we are  
in a position to get a full index, so several will be  
done in active. The rest of the list the war is  
like this, "now it is a lot of fun, a few words:  
"October" could be a month's list & still  
acts of sacrifice & the like. So so we are still  
"I" & the like, & the moral is "it is a, al-  
ways difficult, but now it is difficult, with the  
the limited number of words in a sentence. So so, wireless  
classic "I" &  
"I" & "I" & "I" & "I" & "I" & "I" & "I" & "I" & "I" &

120 L 529

several problems of despotism were fully solved. The most serious  
of which, for us, is now the lack of control of Bulgaria,  
a totalitarian regime, the lack of the resistance against  
which has a long past. We have been in touch with these  
for the last 10 years. Particular difficulties for some  
time past, and now a direct war with the same and  
material for their arrest, some of the at present live  
as a dissident to escape in Bulgaria is only a definite  
risk which is avoided from Bulgaria. But it must be  
remembered that Bulgaria as a whole are not a very fertile  
field and especially is seit our great difficulties  
against them so far as we are seen, however, much will  
depend on the attitude of the Soviet Union.

$$h \circ \tilde{f}_{h,1} = \tilde{f}_1 \circ \tilde{h}_1$$

We were in direct touch with a number of important  
crieffians and secured their willingness to create a  
peasants' front, the Kalarin, or said that we could  
organize them via Kalarin, and would enter into some  
cooperative arrangement. Mr. Gittins, Aliardia wrote, they  
would be most glad to do so. In December last the matter  
was referred to the Bureau de l'Empire, Middle East, who  
decided that for the moment it was necessary, equipment could  
not be spared for training, and that in any case a rising  
at that stage was undesirable.

Under that null &, we restricted our active measures to the 'filtration' - small bands of Abarian sab teams behind the Ite lai lines, with equipment provided, some gas is a success & to fed our efforts, but recent events have made the question of work in Alania rather stale &c.

(v1) VI <sup>ST</sup> A A

Among the Balkan States, Yugoslavia has probably  
the most fertile field for subversive activities. Here  
there is a large majority as made by establishing contact  
with certain fascistic groups. But then we have  
been exerting and supporting these contacts, which latterly  
have forced all the political parties in opposition. The  
parties in question are strongest in South Serbia, in  
Slovenia, and in Montenegro, with the assistance of which  
we have organized the mass organization primarily of Slovaks,  
but also of many other warlike nationalities. Their  
strength is great, and from the fact that the political  
situation for the recent elections was largely predicated  
by their elements. What we can expect from the allied  
parties is that during the next few months in Yugoslavia, of course,  
large-scale losses. In Serbia and Montenegro, as well as  
in Bulgaria we shall have to be more difficult than in Serbia,  
but as long as the communists have a massive majority in the  
parliament there. In a case we have to be very  
careful with the various groups of the opposition at  
the same time as a friend of N.Y. in Yugoslavia  
and the Balkans. The communists also have  
large numbers of supporters in Bulgaria and in Romania, but  
here also, in the last 12 months, the activity will  
be reduced. In a balance of a general, still the German empire is still  
predicated.

173] THE HISTORY OF THE PAPAL CHURCH

1. To open direct WFT with the various organisations in France, particularly with the local GRCs, who have liaison offices in each metropolitan satellite city, and to provide WFT cells.
2. To continue to recruit and subvert the communards, as well as to subvert the SNC.

Even though the following will work at a distance, we will not be able to receive in one station what is sent to another. There is no way that any two stations can receive the same information. This is a basic principle of radio communication.

2. 1) OR 15.5% 100% CF

1000 - 10000 TFS

I have found nothing in the records of the  
central railroads of the country to indicate  
any such movement. The civil rights board is at liberty  
to come to a conclusion.

3

without too many difficulties. Dutch intelligence, for various reasons, is not yet in a position to give us much information, but we shall have to decide on the tempo of our operations. But the German grip on Holland is strong, and generally the prospects for subversive action this year may be said to be not very great.

There is little first-hand information about subversive activities in Belgium, but it is evident, from the press, that centres of resistance do exist and that anti-German feeling is at high ebb. Contact has not yet been established, but agents and operators are under training and should be in the field shortly. Passive resistance will be encouraged in the first instance and acts of sabotage left for a later date. For the rapid growth of a passive resistance network, intensive propaganda will be necessary and it is hoped that S.O.1 will soon institute a Belgian Freedom Station.

As is probably the case with most countries, Belgian will to resist varies in accordance with reports of British victories or defeats. It is only the cream of the population who will maintain their faith in the face of British defeat. On the whole not a great deal can be expected in Belgium for some time and pending a considerable German defeat. Many Flemings are pro-German and many Walloons are defeatist. A national consciousness exists, but it will require great stimulation before it really counts as a factor in the struggle with Germany.

#### (x) DENMARK

The Danes, following the tame capitulation of their Government, have taken a long time to find their national consciousness, partly because the Germans have been less brutal to them than to the other peoples in occupied lands, and have bought their agricultural produce at good prices on paper in such a way as to make it hard for Danish agricultural interests to perceive that the whole thing is a gigantic swindle.

Nevertheless, the Danish national spirit is now pretty satisfied, and "cold shoulder" tactics against the Germans (which the latter fortunately find extremely offensive) are spreading rapidly.

S.O.2 are in touch with Danish organisations and are fostering this spirit and teaching the art of passive resistance of every kind. It is perhaps unlikely that we shall be able to go much beyond this in Denmark unless we are prepared to call for an air assault. We are training Danes in this country as organisers and parachutists and, if ever there were a possibility of an offensive against the Germans in this country, we should have a number of saboteurs and Fifth Column men available with the necessary reception committees inside the country.

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slj,

(xi) NORWAY

Of all the countries with which we have to deal Norway is the most difficult and for the following reasons due to the fact that with her long indented coastline and its proximity to Great Britain, our first line of communication can, and partly to reinforce us, and to all points, Norway will be a natural base of operations. If Germany is unable to conquer Norway, it is difficult to conceive of her being able to do so, and especially after a series of Norwegian air raids, carried out at the highest possible level. She will not in fact, which is intended by the small force to be sent, be able to hold them back.

As in Poland, with which country there are some points of resemblance, there is a short term policy for the short term, and a long term policy falling into two distinct parts, as follows:-

1. A long term policy of preparation for a simultaneous uprising all over Norway on the occasion of (but on no account in advance of) either a landing by an Allied expeditionary force, or an incipient German collapse. For these purposes the indigenous anti-Nazi organisations in Norway are being primarily reserved, and we are endeavouring so far as possible to equip, train and organise them to that end.
2. A short term policy of surreptitious sabotage, both active and passive, and for co-operation with and assistance for air raids, or "tip-and-run" landings on the Norwegian coast.

Surreptitious sabotage in Norway is well under way. Passive resistance to the Germans is in full swing and developing fast. To complete the short term portion of the policy it is hoped to organise as many air raids, and "tip-and-run" landings against specific objectives in the Lofoten model, as may be practicable, although much of this activity must necessarily be postponed until the autumn owing to the short Norwegian summer nights. Large numbers of Norwegians are now under training for such raids (e.g. on fish factories) which will hit the Germans quite hard as well as encourage the morale of the local inhabitants.

It is assumed that the locking up of a number of German Divisions in Norway, which will be the result of this short term policy, will be desirable from the strategic point of view.

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sly.

5 A 7 PO 77 AL

3.12.11. 8.30 AM. 1000' TIDE. 1000' TIDE. 1000' TIDE.  
1000' TIDE. 1000' TIDE. 1000' TIDE. 1000' TIDE.  
1000' TIDE. 1000' TIDE. 1000' TIDE. 1000' TIDE.

W. T. STANLEY DAVIS AND CO. CUT THE CUSH  
B. F. FORD AND CO. CUT THE CUSH  
T. J. L. CUT THE CUSH  
A. C. C. CUT THE CUSH  
C. E. C. CUT THE CUSH  
G. M. C. CUT THE CUSH  
G. D. C. CUT THE CUSH

In the event of Spain or Portugal attacking Germany, it  
is proposed that the British Government should make available  
to the Spanish and Portuguese governments, a force of 100,000 men, to be  
trained in Spain, Portugal, and in the British Isles. This  
force would be available, if the Spanish and Portuguese  
government permitted it to remain, however, it may be said that, so far  
as Spain is concerned, it may be of use to the Spanish government  
to keep a large, but perhaps not so large, force in the British Isles  
or in Portugal. This is for a vital reason, and that is  
that the Spanish or Portuguese government is not at present sufficiently armed, or  
is not in a position to put the available force to any other  
use.

In Poland, broadly speaking, the same applies. No state or party is in a position to get in touch with opposition elements, though there are investigations into possibilities of subversive organisation for a future attempt of some kind. There are, in the event of a German attack, no arrangements, no reliable organisation or the lines of our own home guard.

In both Spain and Portugal the situation now, after a  
possibly the Germans, owing to failure elsewhere, may be  
found in the long run to have neither the will nor the  
ability to invade the Iberian Peninsula. At the same time the  
development of our own naval, the entry of America into the  
war and the assistance of a British Expeditionary force  
to South America are factors which may bring about the  
end of the war at present aims of both countries.  
But that moment is still a long way off.

1. THEORY NOT ANSWER

In South Africa the S.O.E. has a very important role. It is able to use the existing, well developed army & maritime resources pursued to an extreme. In addition, the absence of a large body of white Afrikaners makes the use of native manpower difficult. Of the Germans, a lot of them are now available, but they are not yet fully trained. A large number of them are now in the South African Army, and are not available for use. The absence of facilities, especially in the absence of a large body of Afrikaners, makes the use of the Afrikaners difficult. But a plan is being developed to make use of the Afrikaners. The first step is to train them at the various training centers.

(111) FERNANDE 1.52 8.75

274 a, S. 9. The following is the list of the books -  
which are being offered for sale at the Conference

1472 E. S. FAIR

348 *PLA*

For various reasons there is at present little  
direct submarine work in Swiss and S.G.B.  
ports. From 1914-1918 there was a great deal of coal traffic  
between the Swiss ports and the British Isles.  
of these plans has proved practicable.

On the other hand, Switzerland is of great importance  
from which to organize a base in time.  
The Swiss representative in Rome is at  
present in touch with organizations in the first two of  
the three seas.

1. S.T.J.

The Swedish are a democratic free democracy, and  
so long as they are free, to an extent  
they are. This is not so far as far as pro-  
gress.

On the other hand, Sweden and we are at peace for a very  
long time. They are a people who like neutrality. They  
are not interested in their public neutrality as an end  
in itself, but as a means to an end. They are such  
that they can be utilized by a "Machiavelli" to  
put us in a difficult position. They would almost certainly fight  
us off in the air, though better armed than they were,  
though they were, of course, weak in the air.

An improvement in our own position in Sweden has  
occurred since last June. This is partly due to Allied  
success and partly the result of small economic concessions  
to the Swedes. As a result of this policy we have obtained  
certain influence among the Swedes, including Swedish  
co-operation in the formation of the German  
colonial from the Kriegsakademie "People". In  
addition, the Swedes see Sweden as an intelligence centre

Consequently, S.O.E. would at we shall continue to  
bolster up Sweden's stance to German advances by a bland  
and conciliatory attitude. This has been done, however,  
but it is not enough. We must be prepared for war  
with Sweden in a position to be rearmed rapidly by  
filling her with fighter aircraft and possibly, by creating  
a diversion somewhere on the Norwegian coast.

Hence present subversive operations for Sweden must be  
partly confined to making plans for the seizure of  
important objectives in the event of German occupation of  
the country or part of it, and if possible should they  
include clandestine operations. It is the Swedish Government  
to assist their own subversive organisations in such an

But Sweden is also a very important point for  
intelligence, secret and communication with Part 3. I think  
we should be doing it. In fact, such a point should be  
done in the first place. It can only be done if from Sweden  
is important to us for the reason that Sweden's neutrality is  
to be used or taken in the event of Sweden's entry into  
the war. It can be used about a week, so  
as to break Germany's will.

The Swedish policy is likely to be very  
low in our interest. After all, the only points  
which are concerned with the war are the ports  
which are controlled by the Kriegsakademie. It is  
possible to take the Kriegsakademie, the Kriegsakademie

of judicious carrots, persuade the Swedish Government to wink at our efforts on behalf of their neighbours.

**III FINLAND**

The issue regarding this small power is confused by consideration of sentiment aroused by her courageous resistance to Russian aggression during the recent war.

It is a truism that Finnish policy is conditioned by fear of Russia and this fact, coupled with Finland's geographical position and her difficulty in obtaining supplies during the postwar period, when they are particularly badly needed, accounts for her present close relations with our enemies. The desire for freedom in Finland is too strong for her friendship with Germany to be based upon an affinity of outlook. The Germans supply Finland with many of her necessities, including anti-tank guns and other armaments, and succeed in creating the notion in Finland that there will be at event an armed conflict between Germany and the Soviets, from which, if Finland is friendly to Germany to-day, she is bound to benefit. They also cultivate the impression that if Russia should again attack Finland the Germans will no longer passively acquiesce, but will help the Finns to resist.

As a result of this policy, Germany is obtaining from Finland certain economic advantages, as well as valuable transit rights which simplify extremely her problem of reinforcing and relieving her garrisons in northern Norway.

On the other hand the Finns are able to import small quantities of goods and to keep a communication with the western world through Petsamo, and this communication is being used by us as a lever to obtain from them compensating economic advantages and (what is from the S.O. angle more important) the maintenance of the present system whereby the Finns allow us to have "Trade Inspectors" at important points throughout Finland.

Consequently S.O.E. desire to use the Trade Inspectors as the nucleus of a native organisation to be used for the following purposes:

- 1) To interfere by sly and, so far as possible by "natural" means, with Finnish supplies for Germany, and notably nickel from Petsamo
- 2) To create dumps of explosives, arms and other equipment to be used, in the event of Finland becoming completely dominated by Germany, for a general sabotage campaign to be carried on with the assistance of Finnish anti-Nazi elements.
- 3) To gain detailed intelligence regarding the best methods of attacking important installations, so as to be completely prepared with plans for sabotage to be put into operation at the appropriate time.
- 4) To act as channels for the organisation of subversive operations in North Norway

Generally speaking the maintenance of Finnish neutrality is not, from the S.O. point of view, quite as important as

the maintenance of Swedish neutrality. Moreover, it is submitted that the importance of certain Finnish supplies  
to us is such that if the Finns are forced to give up  
their neutrality, it would be difficult to obtain

(via Soviet P.M.)

For obvious reasons it is not possible for S.O.E. to operate at present within the Soviet Union, but we are, however, exploring the possibility of sending a representative who would be attached to the British Embassy in Moscow.

This officer would, in the initial stages, do nothing but keep his eyes open, but in the event of the Soviet authorities becoming well disposed towards us, he would endeavour to get in touch with the OGPU and to arrange joint action in the Middle East and elsewhere. This is perhaps a faint hope, but provided we get hold of the right man, we think the idea is worth pursuing.

(a) Enemy Countries

i. ITALY

British successes undoubtedly caused something like despair among the Italian population, but no active opposition to their régime or to their German allies is likely to result. Even before the German victories in North Africa and in the Balkans, despair in Italy was tending to fade into apathy, and Italians, however discontented, were looking to the Germans for salvation against their common foe. In fact, there is no doubt that Italians as a whole still see no alternative to the Fascist regime but chaos or Communism; they believe that the Germans alone will protect them against death and ruin, and, rightly or wrongly, they assume that a German victory would result in a better post-war position for Italy than a defeat inflicted by the British Empire.

These feelings have not been seriously weakened by internal conditions. The Fascist régime has been at great pains to provide that war restrictions are not too onerous, that there is sufficient food and even sufficient amusement. Special steps have been taken, for instance, to keep open Opera Houses and Cinemas so that the Italian may well say to himself that he is better placed than the Londoner. Hence it is not surprising that there is no sign of active disaffection, even among the working classes. Certainly, elements and organisations could be encouraged and strengthened for action in the future, but in order that such elements may act effectively, a first essential is that communication should be established with them. Various steps have already been taken to this end, and we are, for instance, encouraging small groups of workers to indulge in subversive activities. In addition, we hope shortly to get in touch with very high authorities in Italy in order to organise opposition to the Fascist régime and to the German occupation.

Since there is obviously at present no prospect of military operations against metropolitan Italy, three courses remain. They are:

- 1) Intensive propaganda.
- 2) The establishment of contacts and infiltration of agents.
- 3) Attacks on as large a scale as possible by the Navy and the R.A.F., with the object of changing the present apathy into fear.

There is no doubt that (3), if possible, would greatly assist (1) and (2), which S.O.E. are already pursuing to the best of their ability. In addition, volunteers have been recruited, and will shortly be under training, for counter-espionage or subversive activities either in Italy itself or in whatever still remains of the Italian Empire.

The occupation of Yugoslavia has, of course, hindered our work in Italy very considerably, and the occupation of Spain would be an even greater blow; but so long as we have our representative in Switzerland (q.v.) it should be possible for us to work certain lines, while actual infiltration from the air could always be carried out from Malta

(iii) GERMANY

Germany, hardest nut to crack from the military point of view, is also the hardest from the point of view of subversive warfare. At the moment probably not more than one German in ten has any suspicion that Germany may after all be going to lose the war. Listless and apathetic they well may be; but confidence in victory is only equalled by an acute appreciation of what is likely to happen to Germans in the event of defeat.

Given this outlook there is very little that can usefully be done in Germany, beyond propaganda, at the present time. A certain amount of sabotage has in fact been organised in Austria from Slovenia, but this must now necessarily cease. Apart from this, preparatory work is being undertaken to organise the various Socialist and Democratic Parties, and to prepare productive schemes for sabotaging the administration and for bribery. In addition, American business men are visiting Germany in order to report on various aspects interesting to us.

In such circumstances, however, it would be useless to drop agents or "organisers". Even if they were not caught, they could achieve little good. All this may well be possible later, when the absence of German victory, or even German defeat, have prepared the way for subversion, and when intensive bombing has undermined the rather brittle German morale. In the meantime we shall naturally select and train our "organisers", keep all possible lines open, and do such propaganda damage as we may.

17.1.5.2

Recent events have shown that in the last six months subversive action against the Axis has made considerable progress and is making a definite contribution towards the destruction of the war effort of our enemies. Progress is necessarily slow, as extreme care and circumspection has to be used in creating the organisations and establishing

the necessary communications. Immediate results should not be asked for or expected, where results of value are now being obtained, i.e. Norway, Yugoslavia, Poland, etc., these are the outcome of long patience, enabling the construction of an organisation which can operate effectively and is not easily disrupted.

There is still immense scope for development in this branch of warfare. The possibilities in all parts of the world are now being actively studied at the same time as existing fields are being further exploited, and all possible encouragement and support given.

Like the other Services, i.e. the Navy, Army and Air Force, S.O.2 are handicapped by the existing shortages of arms, of aircraft, of transport facilities, etc.; when these are made up, progress will quicken.

As explained in foregoing paragraphs, in some cases we are aiming at an eventual rising and in others at maintaining their neutrality, while in many countries we seek to make the utmost use of sabotage and propaganda as being the most effective immediate weapons. To effect this requires the fullest support that can be given in money, in materials, in wireless, in transport and communication facilities generally, the more assistance we can give, the more control do we exert over all activities and their sponsors, be they emigre governments or opposition leaders.

We are still far from the stage when a general uprising in any occupied country would be the slightest aid to the Allied cause; it would be the reverse. Our policy for the immediate future must, it is suggested, be as follows:

To assist by all means in our power the organisation and equipping of clandestine military forces in such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Norway.

To encourage in those and other occupied territories the greatest degree of sabotage, etc., that can be undertaken without inciting destructive reprisals.

In neutral countries to combat Axis interests, whether political or material, in every possible field, and in particular to combat "infiltration".

In enemy territory to instigate the highest degree of sabotage, espionage, propaganda, etc., that can be effective.

Subversion is a weapon which we can use offensively and continuously wherever the enemy's interests can be reached. Intangible and elusive, it is a form of attack which exerts a constant pressure and constitutes a continuous strain on his resources and his will. Ultimately, like subversion by the Germans, it depends for its success on the armed forces. But with us, and fortunately, this factor operates to a lesser degree. With some exceptions, the occupied nations did not want to be "subverted" by Hitler's tourists. When we are stronger

and can play the same game, it will be a very different  
thing. The Fifth Column of treachery should be easier to  
control than the Fifth Column of Fascism, because its  
motive force will be superior in every way.

Yet if the S.O.E. is to be responsible for this work, provision must be made for their needs and intelligent, long-distance planning must take place here and now. Without this tools they cannot even begin, far less finish the job. For instance, it may well be desirable to allot a number of Sten guns for S.O. purposes. Further, the whole question of the relation of foreign forces in this country to S.O. activities has still to be thought out. Finally there is no doubt that, in the nature of things, there is often bound to be a conflict of view between S.O.E., who wish to "keep the pot boiling", and "C", who is above all interested to prevent any incident likely to result in Gestapo activity and hence unfavourably to affect his prospects of obtaining intelligence. This difficulty is real and cannot be buried. Minor differences of opinion can be, and are, successfully overcome, but differences of policy can only, in the last resort, be referred to the Chiefs of Staff for a ruling.

In any case there is no doubt that S.O.E., unless they are to lose their whole raison d'être, will have to train and infiltrate large numbers of agents during the coming year (between 400 and 800 men are already in training.) If they are to do this successfully, suitable aeroplanes in sufficient numbers must be made available, new and reliable communications ensured. On both these points the Chiefs of Staff have recently been approached and it is hoped that their support will be forthcoming. In any case, it would be helpful to the S.O.E. if the Chiefs of Staff could say whether they agree with the general picture as outlined above; whether they consider that the policy recommended is the right one; and, if so, whether they are prepared to make available to the S.O.E. the men and materials necessary for carrying it out

P/1341

Extract from a copy entitled "Subscription", printed  
for the "Volks" File, October, 1940

ANSWER II.

P/1341

FOR THE CHOICE  
S.W. 1.

SECRET.

18th August 1940

My Dear Dalton.

In accordance with a decision of the War Cabinet of July 22nd, I understand that you will co-ordinate the activities of what are known as "D" and M.I.6., and S.E., though it was then agreed that provisionally the various parties and bodies taking part in underground activities would, for the time being, continue to be administered by the ministers responsible for them.

I consider the time has come for you to take over control of these various activities and I therefore request that you will take over the "D" organisation which has hitherto been under my

control.

Yours sincerely,

SI ned - HALIFAX

The Right Honourable  
Hugh Dalton, M.P.

solve by friendly agreement, here again the matter must be submitted by both sides to higher authority. At the same time it is hoped, in the near future to establish a "Transport Panel

consisting/-

Annex II.  
September 16, 1940.

(Most Secret

C and D have agreed as follows :-

1. D is a separate, secret organisation, forming part of a larger organisation under the control of Mr. Dalton. The function of this organisation is the promotion of subversion. For general purposes of administration and discipline, therefore, the D organisation comes under Mr. Dalton and not under the Foreign Secretary. The function of C, who operates under the control of the Foreign Secretary, is the collection, collation and distribution of secret information and intelligence.

2. At the same time D is intimately associated with C, both on historical and on practical grounds, and if he is to function efficiently, it must be with the friendly co-operation of C. There are three respects in which the interests of C and D may clash and the following measures have been agreed on in order to preserve harmony :-

(a) Projects

A project may quite possibly be good for purposes of subversion, but bad for purposes of Intelligence.

If such a project comes before the D Board it will be the duty of the C representative on that Board to draw the attention of his Chief to any disadvantage in it which he may see. If C is then unable to reach an agreement with D on the point, it must be submitted to higher authority.

(b) Transport

At the moment and in the immediate future it may well be that C and D will be competing for available transport. If there is a real clash of interests which it is impossible to solve by friendly agreement, here again the matter must be submitted by both sides to higher authority. At the same time it is hoped, in the near future, to establish a "Transport Pool" consisting/-

consisting of both ships and aeroplanes which should suffice for the purposes of both C and D.

(b) Communications.

C will continue to afford D such facilities for the use of S.I.S. cyphers and communications as the requirements and security of S.I.S. permit, but these communications will remain under the control of C. Should, for any reason, a telegram submitted by D for transmission by C, be rejected by the latter C will of course be informed, in which case he will endeavour to make other arrangements.

(d) Spheres of Interest.

These have already been defined in paragraph 1. It follows that, if D's agents collect intelligence other than that on specifically D affairs, it must be passed on to C before being circulated anywhere, even within the D organisation itself. Conversely, if any of C's men is in a position to perform or to recommend some act of subversion, C will get in touch with D before taking any action.

(e) Recruitment of Agents.

D is at liberty to take the initiative in recruiting agents but can only definitely engage them with the knowledge and subject to appeal the approval of C or of C's representative.

(f) Finance.

The exact method of financing the D organisation will be left for further discussion.

"S" T. SEC. T.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE  
BERKELEY SQUARE HOUSE  
BERKELEY SQUARE W1

124 September 1 19

state at based on the meeting  
held yesterday afternoon of which  
I have now formed the foundation of  
an agreement as to the division of  
functions between C and D.

Please let me know, as soon as possible, whether you concur or have any amendments to make.

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The exact method of mixing the formulation will be left for further

1. DVB & PCC

1. The secretariat will be responsible for the preparation of the  
statistical report and for the distribution of the report to the  
Committee. The secretariat will also be responsible for the  
distribution of the report to the members of the Committee.

2. The secretariat will be responsible for the preparation of the  
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b. Report

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c. Distribution

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d. Parties of interest

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e. Other

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ACT 1958.

WP(40) 271

19 July 1940

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34 OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1968

As you will remember, we were in touch a little time ago with a view to creating, in the 'line of service' to consider enemy propaganda.

We have now discussed with the War Office, the War Office and the 'Foreign Office' (Sir Campbell Stuart) in a view to making a arrangement which would fit in with the various interests concerned. The arrangement which has been made is as follows: subject to your approval, to the Foreign Office (Sir Olley, the War Office (Major General Beaumont Webb) and Sir Campbell Stuart is that we should nominate an individual to General Llewellyn staff whom would be paid by the War Office and who would be entrusted with the task of dealing with counter propaganda.

Suitable individual (Lieut-Colonel L. G. Clayton, has been discovered and General will be prepared to accept him if he is nominated. Further instructions have been drafted and agreed by the three authorities above, subject to your approval.

The cost involved is difficult to estimate at this moment, the expenditure will not be excessive. It is either £1000 or £2000, but will be the cost of direct action of one sort or another. Owing to the nature of war in the Central portion of Italy, it is possible that there will be an alteration in attitude of the Arab tribes and it may, therefore, be that the book for which we were allocated, in the first place will not now be required. This will, in fact, go to fit the activities suggested for some months, if there is no continuation on the part, it is believed that the book is still essential.

It is, therefore, proposed to submit the matter to you for your consideration.

2.

to Colonel Clayton may be approved and what authority may be given to allocate to him initially \$1,000 for use as may be required, with liberty to apply for further sum as may be necessary.

21st September, 1939.

Copy in file

471

PROGRADUA - EGYPT

72

By agreement with the War Office, you will proceed to join G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East, as G.S.O.1, Publicity.

(2) You will be paid from War Office funds and your appointment will be gazetted shortly.

(3) You will have at your disposal a sum of money not from War Office funds which will be used under your direction for propaganda of a clandestine nature with the following objects:-

- (i) In general you will be responsible that the attitude of the tribes bordering on Libya is favourable to whatever operations may be contemplated by G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East.
- (ii) As regards Transjordan and the desert tribes, you will be responsible for assisting, by means of clandestine propaganda, whatever policy may best assist operations contemplated by G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East. In Abyssinia you will be responsible for whatever work may be required among the natives of Abyssinia, as opposed to Italian tribes and garrisons.

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ACT 1458

(5) You are not responsible for and will not engage in propaganda dealing with the Italian garrisons in either Libya or Abyssinia. This work is being arranged separately, but in due course you should co-operate with Sir Campbell Stuart's representative ( ) who will be stationed at

(6) You will work, by means of staff who will not be, as a rule, military, unless you so desire; and in that case you will arrange the details direct with G.O.C.-in-C., Middle East. You are not responsible for and will not engage in press propaganda amongst the Egyptian population other than tribes, as this is being done by the Foreign Office through the Embassy.

(7) Amongst other methods which may commend themselves to you, the following may be considered:-

- (a) Production and distribution of gramophone records suitable for use in coffee shops.
- (b) Production and distribution of leaflets as and when required.
- (c) Pounding and support of howiyahs particularly amongst the Semussi.
- (d) Production and distribution of any literature that may seem advisable and, in this connexion, a book is now being prepared in Arabic giving, from German documents and speeches, their view of the Arab race. It is hoped that this will be ready for press in about a fortnight and can be printed either in London or in Egypt.
- (e) You may consider it desirable to recommend the distribution at cheap rates of radio sets designed to take one station only, e.g., Coventry short wave, a local Egyptian station. It is possible to produce such

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3 (M) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1958

such a set around 40 and the exact rate at which they should be sold will, of course, be a matter for local consideration.

(8) As it is possible that the above activities, e.g., telephone records, wireless sets, etc., may tend to assume a commercial value, you may consider it desirable to foster such a center and to train a number of commercial type clerks, who would be calling on coffee shops, etc., with records and wireless sets, to spread information and propaganda by word of mouth which, as you will be the first to appreciate, is a valuable medium among the Arab people. If suitable avenues, e.g., coffee, sugar, sweets, etc., are available to give wings to these commercial activities, they will be maintained.

(9) The possibility of the use of suitable files will be borne in mind. It would appear that there are two general lines of which action might be desirable in this connexion, (a) the standard file shown in the local cinemas, and (b) the semi-standard file which might possibly be of value if employed on a mobile van, possibly temporarily engaged in setting requirements in the desert or visiting localities. Should you require the development of this suggestion, you will inform us at the earliest possible date so that we may arrange for the production or selection of the necessary files. As, in this connexion, it should be noted that the methods by which files are shown in cinemas are extremely complicated and it will probably be necessary to send you out expert advice on this subject.

(10) In every case where you require material from this country you will give us, as far as possible, the general line indicating your requirements, in addition to any particular items you may wish to have for the particular subject or the occasion, and, if you wish a translation sent over the

station, this can be made and recorded in London and sent out to be put on as required, but it will be appreciated that a script for broadcasting, or indeed for films, is an expert document, the writer of which requires to know primarily the general policy at which he is aiming, e.g., a talk on the British Army and its task in the Middle East, might be done from the point of view of the might of Britain or the wealth of Britain, or war aims, or friendliness, and it will be important, even if a suggested script is produced by you, that there shall be a paragraph attached giving quite clearly (i) The audience which it is desired shall be mainly impressed, (ii) Their present feelings, (iii) The message which it is desired shall remain in their minds, and in this connexion it will be appreciated that not more than one simple message should be conveyed by one broadcast or one film.

Personnel.

(ii) The following individuals can be made available, some or all of whom may be of use:-

(i)

(ii)

(iii) Wortham. Formerly Editor of one or more papers in Cairo. Now employed in Fleet Street on "The Daily Telegraph". Interviewed and would be prepared to accept suitable appointment. Arabic

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3.

perfect and knowledge of Egyptian antisemites.

(iv) Westbrook. Formerly Political Officer in the Western Desert (1942-45). This individual is very keen to go work for this mission, but it is not known at the moment on what he is employed. It is believed, however, that he can be obtained.

Finance.

(1) As a preliminary a sum of \$1,000 will be paid into any account which you may nominate in Egypt for use by you and this will be replaced as required. The only commitment at the present moment is that a sum, which is being used for the formation of battalions in the desert areas bordering on Libya. In this connection you should liaise with Colonel A. J. Mathison, who is on General Maitlis' staff and will be prominent at your activities.

4.

19.9.46.